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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' governs abusive tac-
tics and frivolous pleadings, motions, or other papers submitted in federal
court. Since 1983, when the Rule was strengthened to encourage sanction-
ing, judges increasingly have sanctioned litigants advancing far-fetched
claims, or filing papers based on hasty research into the facts or the law.'
In just under five years, Rule 11 has produced over 1,000 cases' and a
flurry of academic commentary.4 Rule 11 is transforming the conduct of
litigation in the federal courts.5
Critics of amended Rule 11 argue that it chills creative advocacy,6 gen-
erates wasteful satellite litigation,7 interferes with the attorney-client rela-
1. For the relevant text of Rule 11, see infra note 24.
2. See, e.g., Heimbaugh v. City of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (recent
law school graduate alleged equal protection violation because police forced students playing softball
in city park to vacate hardball diamond).
3. Joseph, The Trouble with Rule 11, 73 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 87, 88. Since publication of
the opinion is itself a form of reputational sanction, many cases go unreported or are available only on
LEXIS. See Chrein, The Actual Operation of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16
(1985).
4. See sources cited infra notes 6-15. For empirical studies of Rule 11, see NEW YORK STATE
BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS: SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEYS'
FEES (1987) [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT]; S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11
SANCTIONS (Federal Judicial Center 1985).
5. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1988) ("Rule 11 has
become a significant factor in civil litigation, with an impact that has likely exceeded its drafters'
expectations."). Judges, too, have begun to note the impact of Rule 11 cases on their dockets. See, e.g.,
Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1086 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[Wle now seem almost at the point of saying that the main question
before the court is not 'Are you right?' but 'Are you sanctionable?' "), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101
(1988); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir.) (Pratt, J., dissent-
ing) (referring to "new 'Era of Sanctions' "), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
6. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(Weinstein, C.J.), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Nelken,
Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between
Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1338-43 (1986); Note, Plausible Pleadings:
Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 632 (1987). But see FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983) (note to 1983 Amend-
ments) [hereinafter Advisory Notes] ("The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or
creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.").
7. Rule 11 is aimed partly at relieving federal courts of the burden of processing unnecessary,
frivolous claims. Some commentators note that the Rule has generated enough ancillary litigation over
the applicability of sanctions (so-called "satellite litigation") to undercut the goal of reducing the
courts' workload. See, e.g., FEDERAL PROCEDURE COMM., ABA, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER
POWERS 15-16 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]. But see Levin & Sobel, Achieving Balance
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tionship,8 sours relations between opposing counsel9 and between bench
and bar, 0 overdeters particular types of claimants,"1 and conflicts with the
liberal pleading regime of the Federal Rules."2 Supporters of the Rule,
however, contend that it deters much frivolous litigation (thereby conserv-
ing judicial resources)," compensates the victims of vexatious litigation,
and educates the bar about appropriate standards of conduct.1 '
A problem recognized by both supporters and critics has been Rule 11's
inconsistent application. 5 Varying judicial attitudes-in particular, disa-
greement over the primary purpose of Rule i 1 "-and the absence of
standards or guidelines for deciding both whom to sanction17 and what
sanction is appropriate have produced inconsistent outcomes.,
Nonuniform sanctions have created an impression of arbitrariness, 9 as
in the Developing Law of Sanctions, 36 OATH. U.L. REV. 587, 606-08 (1987) (listing five factors
that reduce danger of satellite litigation).
8. Nelken, supra note 6, at 1343-45. But cf. Comment, Rule 11 Sanctions, 48 MONT. L. REv.
119, 130-132 (1987) (attorney-client privilege and work product protection usually will not be
threatened by Rule 11 proceedings).
9. Weiss, A Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 23, 24 (1985).
10. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
183 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 631 (civil rights plaintiffs). Recent empirical data demon-
strates that civil rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs are sanctioned disproportionately.
Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988); see also LaFrance, Federal
Rule I I and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L. REv. 331, 333 (1988) (arguing that Rule 11 is
"antithetical to public interest litigation").
12. Note, supra note 6. One critic has gone so far as to question the power of judicial rulemakers
to impose mandatory sanctions. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1008-09 (1983).
13. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 119; Note, Litigant Responsibility: Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 and Its Application, 27 B.O.L. REV. 385, 406 (1986).
14. Levin & Sobel, supra note 7, at 594. One commentator has suggested that amended Rule 11
is not stringent enough. See Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal
Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325.
15. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 1015 ("In interpreting and applying rule 11, the courts
have become a veritable Tower of Babel."); Note, supra note 6, at 638-41; Grosberg, The Rule I1
Debate: Circuit Gives No Guidance in Eastway, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 19, col. 4; Joseph,
supra note 3, at 89; see also infra Section III-A.
16. See infra Section II-B.
17. The secondary literature on amended Rule 11 has not analyzed the problem of whom to
sanction, discussing it only briefly in the context of broader surveys of the Rule. See, e.g., Vairo,
supra note 11, at 227-28; Note, supra note 13, at 402-03; Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Prevent-
ing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 331
n.228 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11]. But see Note, The Intended Application
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: An End to the "Empty Head, Pure Heart" Defense and a
Reinforcement of Ethical Standards, 41 VAND. L. REv. 343, 353-54, 376-77 (1988) [hereinafter
Note, Intended Application] (arguing that in most cases courts should sanction attorney alone).
18. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Rule 11 deci-
sions "have not always been consistent, producing confusion among the bench and bar, as well as
inequitable results.").
19. See S. KASSIN, supra note 4, at 45 (finding willingness among judges to sanction but limited
"clarity and uniformity" in Rule's application); Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer
Performance: Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REv. 575, 587-88 & nn. 42-43 (1987); see also
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 126 (2d Cir.) (Pratt, J., dissenting)
(noting "apparent disparities, even capriciousness, that now seem to characterize much of rule 11
jurisprudence"). cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Weiss, supra note 9, at 26 ("Many judges...
Rule 11 Sanctions
judges and jurisdictions with different sanctioning records2" have imposed
varying sanctions on similarly situated violators.2 1 Lack of uniformity has
undercut Rule 11's goals. 22 More fundamentally, judges and commenta-
tors have tended to view Rule 11 as involving discrete and unconnected
judicial determinations.
This Note proposes an integrated approach to Rule 11 sanctions that
will promote consistency in sanctioning practice. Section I briefly describes
the Rule and its 1983 amendments. Section II proposes an analytical
framework for understanding the three interpretive questions posed by
Rule 11 -when is the Rule violated, who should be sanctioned, and what
sanction is appropriate-and demonstrates that these questions are in-
separably linked. It then argues that judges should bear in mind both this
conceptual framework and the primary purpose of Rule 11-deterring
frivolous litigation-when making sanction determinations. Section III
demonstrates how judges have failed to understand the interconnectedness
of Rule 1 1's interpretive questions, producing failures in the Rule's appli-
cation. This Section also explains why appeals courts have failed to bring
uniformity to Rule 11 case law. Section IV sets forth the benefits greater
uniformity would bring, and Section V offers guidelines, based on the de-
veloping case law, to aid judges in answering the Rule's most neglected
questions: whom to sanction and what sanction to impose.
I. THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 11
Rule 11 was originally passed along with the other Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938, but judges employed it infrequently. 3 In re-
sponse to growing concern over frivolous lawsuits and abusive tactics in
federal court, Rule 11 was amended in 1983, a move which broadened its
scope significantly.24 The standards for sanctionable conduct were en-
have deep-seated biases and are out to get particular lawyers. And boy, Rule 11 is some tool to do it
with.").
20. According to Professor Grosberg, in the first two years under amended Rule 11, 12.2% of all
Rule 11 opinions in which sanctions were imposed were written by three (of 684 sitting) federal
judges: Judges Shadur (N.D. Ill.), Schwarzer (N.D. Cal.), and Haight (S.D.N.Y.). Grosberg, supra
note 19, at 587 n.42.
21. Parness, The New Method of Regulating Lawyers: Public and Private Interest Sanctions
During Civil Litigation for Attorney Misconduct, 47 LA. L. REV. 1305, 1306, 1313 (1987).
22. See infra Sections II-B & IV.
23. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-37 (1976) (only 23 reported cases between
1938 and 1976 in which sanctions sought by party).
24. The relevant text of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with italicized sections
representing 1983 additions, is as follows:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, informa-
tion, and beliefformed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . . . If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its
19881
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larged and made more objective. 5 In addition, the Rule was changed to
require judges to impose sanctions once a violation was found. Judges
were, however, given greater leeway to impose different types of sanctions
and to sanction clients or attorneys. The 1983 amendments were designed
to increase the application of what had been an underused rule.2
Most commentators have hailed the wide latitude17 delegated to trial
judges to fashion appropriate sanctions and to decide whom to sanction. 8
Because of her proximity to the offending conduct, the trial judge is con-
sidered best equipped to apportion responsibility for frivolous submissions
and to tailor sanctions to fit particular violations. Appealing for its sugges-
tion of careful, individualized judgments, this argument nonetheless over-
looks the problems caused by both differences among judges29 and the sys-
temic effect of such highly discretionary, individualized judgments: a lack
of overall uniformity in Rule 11 sanctions.30
II. A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING
RULE 11
Rule 11 is often analyzed as identifying three "prongs" of sanctionable
conduct: legally frivolous, factually frivolous, and motivated by an im-
proper purpose. This way of analyzing the Rule reflects a preoccupation
with the determination of when conduct is sanctionable. A more useful
conceptual framework for understanding Rule 11 considers two additional
interpretive questions and focuses on the primary goal of the
Rule-deterrence of frivolous litigation.
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of thefiling of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 2A J. MOORE, J. LUcAs & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 11.01 (2d ed. 1987).
25. Amended Rule 11 established three prongs of sanctionable conduct: (1) insufficient legal basis,
(2) insufficient factual basis, and (3) improper purpose.
26. Advisory Notes, supra note 6, at 198.
27. Both the broadened discretion to set the type and target of sanctions, and the narrowed discre-
tion to impose a sanction once a violation is found, were aimed at encouraging judges to impose
sanctions. These changes in judicial discretion were not an independent goal of the 1983 amendments,
but rather a means to achieve greater enforcement and thus greater deterrence. The drafters appar-
ently failed to appreciate that there might be little difference between finding no violation under the
old Rule, and finding a violation but imposing a minimal sanction under the new Rule.
28. See, e.g., A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 17 (Fed-
eral Judicial Center 1984) (characterizing "appropriate" sanction language as "judge's safety valve"
given that sanctions must be imposed); Nelken, supra note 6, at 1321-23.
29. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
30. Cf Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 756-58, 768 (1982) (noting
benefits of broader appellate review of discretionary decisions).
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A. Interpretive Questions Posed by the Rule
Rule 11 raises three interconnected interpretive issues for the court: (1)
When has sanctionable conduct occurred? (2) Who should be sanc-
tioned-attorney, client, or both? (3) What sanction is appropriate? Most
commentary and case law under Rule 11 have focused on the threshold
determination of when conduct is sanctionable3 1 This is not surprising,
since the first question determines the circumstances under which the
Rule applies. 2
Courts have not realized the extent to which the latter two questions of
whom to sanction and what sanction is appropriate are related to the
Rule's effective operation. Rule 11's deterrence goals will not be achieved
if judges, once they discover sanctionable conduct, impose an inappropri-
ate type or size of sanction, or sanction the wrong party. Appellate courts
are only beginning to realize that a trial judge opposed to Rule 1i's man-
date of imposing sanctions can undercut the Rule's purposes by imposing
a minuscule sanction."
B. The Confusion over Rule l1's Purpose
1. Compensation, Deterrence, and Punishment
When discussing the purposes behind Rule 11, courts and commenta-
tors mention compensation, 4 deterrence, 5 and punishment.36 Unfortu-
nately, few have gone beyond a mere invocation of one or more purposes
to examine the connection between the Rule's primary purpose and its
effectiveness.
2. The Extent and Effect of Disagreement over Primary Purpose
Even if judges grasp the interconnectedness of Rule 11's interpretive
questions, nonuniformity in sanctioning will persist unless consensus is
31. See, e.g., Grosberg, supra note 19; Note, supra note 13; Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under
Rule 11-Is the Stop, Look, and Investigate Requirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REV.
751 (1985).
32. Because the first question has been deemed one of law, it has been reviewed more often and
under a broader standard of review by courts of appeals. See cases cited infra note 78.
33. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (once viola-
tion found, some sanction must be imposed), overruling Bell v. Bell, 6 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan)
1084 (5th Cir. 1987).
34. Compensation refers to the financial reimbursement, usually of attorneys' fees, to the party
opposing the frivolous submission.
35. Deterrence refers to both the expected inhibiting effect of actual sanctions on violators (spe-
cific deterrence) and the general restraining effect of the threat of sanctions on potential violators
(general deterrence). Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6
n.21 (1987).
36. Punishment implies moral blameworthiness and translates into sanctions commensurate with
the degree of culpability (including the violator's mental state). Id. at 6-7 & n.20. Yet Rule 11 viola-
tions can occur when submissions violate an objective, reasonable attorney standard. Although the
concept of punishment often involves penalizing commensurately to the degree of harm caused, this
view would bring punishment close to the idea of compensation.
19881
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reached over the Rule's overarching purpose. When a rule cannot, on its
face, guide judicial determinations, courts look behind the rule to its pur-
pose; a lack of consensus over purpose will produce variable outcomes.
This variance is accentuated because the Rule's purposes are often in con-
flict.37 While any particular sanction can further all three purposes in
varying degrees,38 situations do arise in which different purposes point the
decisionmaker in different directions. In a particular instance, compensa-
tion may require a very different sanction from specific deterrence or pun-
ishment. Thus, in cases of conflict, one purpose must trump the others.39
Judges have different conceptions of Rule 11's primary purpose, as sev-
eral empirical studies indicate."' A judge's view about primary purpose
has been shown to directly affect her willingness to impose sanctions, 41
and may even influence her determination of the size, type, and target of
sanctions. 42 Disagreement over the purpose of Rule 11 accounts for wide
37. Cf W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 27 (2d ed. 1986) (noting need to determine
priority and relationship of potentially conflicting aims of criminal law).
38. A monetary sanction, for example, will in some way further all three aims; a nonmonetary
sanction will not compensate, however. See also Nelken, supra note 6, at 1314, 1323-25. Although
Nelken accurately describes the interrelation of deterrence, compensation, and punishment, she does
not consider deterrence to be a possible focus of Rule 11. Perhaps this is because she only considers
general deterrence. Similarly, a student Note on the deterrence rationale behind analogous discovery
sanctions did not distinguish between specific and general deterrence but focussed on the latter. See
Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1033 (1978).
39. Commentators on sentencing reform have realized the need to stress a single, overriding pur-
pose behind criminal sentences. See von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's Functions in THE
SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3, 9-10 (A. von Hirsch, K. Knapp & M. Tonry
eds. 1987); Robinson, supra note 35, at 6-7; see also W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 37, at 27
(same in criminal law generally).
40. See S. KASSIN, supra note 4, at 29; NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 4, at 23. When asked
about Rule 1 I's primary purpose, 59.4% of district judges answered deterrence, while 19.6% said
punishment and 21% compensation. S. KASSIN, supra note 4, at 29-32. Kassin's study involved a
survey of 292 active federal district court judges. Judges were asked both to answer general questions
about Rule 11 and to respond to various hypothetical fact situations. The study did not distinguish
between specific and general deterrence.
Despite its more recent date, the New York Bar Association's Report is limited, imprecise, and
generally less useful in determining judicial views about Rule I I's purpose than is Kassin's 1985
national study. See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 4, at 10, A7-A9.
41. See S. KASSIN, supra note 4, at 31. Judges who viewed compensation as Rule 11's key objec-
tive imposed sanctions 61.1% of the time in the hypotheticals. By contrast, those who saw Rule 11 as
aimed at deterrence imposed sanctions only 48.5% of the time. The lowest rate occurred among pun-
ishment-oriented judges: 34.6%. One would thus expect district judges who believe that compensation
is Rule 1l's primary purpose to impose sanctions almost twice as often as judges who focus on
punishment.
42. Although Kassin's research indicated that compensation-oriented judges might grant higher
attorneys' fee awards than punishment-oriented judges (with deterrence-oriented judges in the mid-
dle), "[tihe study does not provide a clear answer" on this issue, id. at 32, because the size of the
subgroup relevant to this issue was too small. Id. at 30 n.63.
Judges who favor compensatory goals would be more likely to impose monetary sanctions and to set
the sanction amount close to defendant's expenses. To ensure compensation, these judges might also
favor joint and several sanctions against the plaintiff and her attorney. By contrast, judges who stress
deterrence may be less likely to impose monetary sanctions, since nonmonetary ones can more effec-
tively deter. In calculating monetary sanctions, deterrence-oriented judges might also be less likely to
start with expenses incurred. These judges would be more likely to adjust a monetary sanction to an
amount that deters the offending attorney or client. Instead of handing down joint and several sanc-
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disparities in sanctioning practice.4
3. Deterrence as the Primary Goal
To reduce disparities in sanctioning, judges should consider deterrence
to be the primary goal of Rule 11. The Advisory Committee Notes men-
tion only deterrence as the purpose behind the 1983 amendments. 44 In
addition, most judges4" and commentators4 agree that deterrence is the
Rule's primary goal.47 Finally, as a procedural rule, Rule 11 is aimed at
streamlining the process of litigation by eliminating-i.e. deter-
ring-frivolous submissions.48
While compensation and punishment may be secondary aims of Rule
11, viewing either one as the Rule's primary purpose would be problem-
tions, judges who stress deterrence might apportion sanctions depending upon whether the party need-
ing deterrence is attorney or client. A final set of judges, those who view the Rule as primarily aimed
at punishment, might sanction only the most egregious violators, fashion the sanction to fit the degree
of bad faith or culpability, and avoid joint and several sanctions unless both sanctioned individuals
have demonstrated culpable behavior.
43. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 4, at 15 ("Examination of the reported cases reveals a great
deal of inconsistency as to whether there has been a Rule 11 violation, and if so, what sanction should
be imposed. Part of the reason for this seems to be that the courts have not yet agreed on the purpose
or purposes of Rule 11."); Vairo, supra note 11, at 203.
44. S. K.sssN, supra note 4, at 29; Grosberg, supra note 19, at 584-85; Schwarzer, supra note 5,
at 1020; see Advisory Notes, supra note 6, at 199-200 ("The word 'sanctions' in the caption...
stresses a deterrent orientation in dealing with improper pleadings, motions or other papers."); id. at
198 (predicting that enforcement of Rule will "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to
streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses"); see also Letter of Trans-
mittal from Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Mar. 9,
1982), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 190, 192 (1983) (mandatory sanctions "a healthy deterrent"); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (Weinstein, C.J.),
modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
Confusion has perhaps resulted because the text of Rule 11 indicates that an appropriate sanction
"may include an order to pay ... the reasonable expenses incurred because of [the frivolous submis-
sion], including a reasonable attorney's fee." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This language only reminds judges
that monetary sanctions may be an appropriate sanction, and does not express a general preference for
compensatory sanctions. See also Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 1020 (contrasting Rule 11 to Rule 37's
explicit authorization of fee shifting, and arguing that "when the drafters of the rules meant to pro-
vide for fee shifting, they knew how to do it").
45. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
46. Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 1020 n.31.
47. See, e.g., In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1184 (9th Cir.) (deterrence "paramount" and "over-
riding" goal of Rule), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (1987).
For examples of judges and commentators who argue that the Rule's focus should be either compensa-
tion or punishment, see Eastway, 821 F.2d at 124-26 (Pratt, J., dissenting) (compensation rationale);
In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) (suggesting that compensation is
major, if not primary, rationale for Rule 11 sanctions); Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay
Prompted the New Rules of Civil Procedure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, 34, col. 2 ("Although
denominated a sanction provision, in reality it is more appropriately characterized as a cost-shifting
technique."); Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 17, at 329 (arguing that purpose is primar-
ily punitive). See generally Grosberg, supra note 19, at 586-87 ("The stated objective of Rule 11 was
to deter frivolous litigation and, thereby lessen the pressures on court dockets. Courts have often
applied Rule 11, however, having in mind the secondary and unstated objectives of penalizing the
offending lawyer and compensating the victim of needless litigation."); Nelken, supra note 6, at
1323-25 (arguing that two divergent views have emerged regarding purpose: compensation and pun-
ishment, with deterrence playing role in both views).
48. Grosberg, supra note 19, at 630-31.
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atic. Several commentators have questioned the authority of the judiciary
under the Rules Enabling Act to promulgate a procedural rule aimed at
shifting costs but not requiring "bad faith." '49 A stress on compensation
would also undercut the traditional American Rule, which requires liti-
gants to bear only their own expenses and serves as a guarantor of access
in American courts. 50 An emphasis on punishment as a primary purpose
might raise similar doubts about faithfulness to the Rules Enabling Act. 51
A punitive focus is inappropriate for a rule that mandates sanctions under
an objective standard but does not require bad faith. Finally, a focus on
punishment would necessitate extensive procedural safeguards for
violators.52
4. Specific and General Deterrence as Guides To Sanctioning
Translating the focus on deterrence into a guide to judicial action is a
complicated task. A key distinction must be maintained between the pur-
pose of Rule 11 and the purpose(s) of any particular sanction imposed
under the Rule.53 The purpose of Rule 11 itself would seem to be general
deterrence: The Rule's existence serves as a general threat to discourage
lawyers and litigants from engaging in prohibited conduct. 4 On the other
hand, the purpose of any particular sanction is primarily specific deter-
49. See Burbank, supra note 12 (questioning judiciary's power to apply either mandatory sanc-
tions or sanctions for mere negligence under amended Rule 11); Grosberg, supra note 19, at 584 &
n.28, 646-47. According to Professor Nelken, the compensation approach "ignores serious questions
about the limits of the Supreme Court's rulemaking power." Nelken, supra note 6, at 1324 n.70; see
also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975) (Congress has not
"extended any roving authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever
the courts might deem them warranted."). See generally Roadway Express, Inc., v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 765-66 (1980) (noting bad faith exception to American Rule).
50. Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 1020 ("[T]o attribute a broad fee-shifting rationale to rule 11 is
contrary to the American Rule; fee shifting ought not to be undertaken without clear authority.").
Professor Vairo has argued that a focus on fee-shifting unduly encourages Rule 11 motions, thereby
souring relations among attorneys and exacerbating the problem of satellite litigation. Vairo, supra
note 11, at 204, 233.
51. See Grosberg, supra note 19, at 584 & n.28 (questioning whether punishment of abusive
lawyers is proper procedural concern or within Supreme Court's rulemaking power under Rules
Enabling Act).
52. If punitive in nature, monetary Rule 11 "fines" might assume a criminal character and, if
they exceeded $500, require additional procedural safeguards, such as the right to jury trial.
Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 202; see Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558-61 (11th Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (discussing procedural safeguards required by due process guarantee). Perhaps because of
the Advisory Committee's insistence that satellite litigation be avoided whenever possible, see Advisory
Notes, supra note 6, at 201, these due process safeguards often have been disregarded. See Comm. on
Fed. Courts, Procedural Rights of Attorneys Facing Sanctions, 40 RECORD 313, 313-16 & n.1 1
(1985).
53. See, e.g., Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in THEORIES OF ETHICS 144 (P. Foot ed. 1977)
(developing distinction between justifying whole practice and justifying particular action under it).
54. The Supreme Court has analogously endorsed general deterrence as a proper goal of discovery
sanctions under Rule 37. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
643 (1976) (per curiam); Note, supra note 38, at 1047.
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rence. 5 A sanction is actually imposed only when general deterrence (via
the threat of sanctions) has failed.
For general deterrence to be achieved, Rule I1's threat of sanctions
must be credible. Sanctions must be imposed when violations occur; this
appears to be happening with greater frequency. As for the size of sanc-
tions, general deterrence normally will be furthered in proportion to the
severity of the sanction." Yet Rule 11 operates against the backdrop of
legitimate litigation activity: Choosing the most severe sanction in each
case would discourage or "chill" legitimate lawsuits and valid litigation
techniques.57 In addition, massive sanctions could, in an individual case,
go well beyond the needs of specific deterrence.
What is needed, then, is a more uniform approach to imposing and
calculating individual sanctions-one that takes into account the differen-
tial need to specifically deter-so that the general deterrent aim is
achieved without overdeterrence. Specific deterrence should be the guiding
principle in the imposition of individual Rule 11 sanctions.", Of course,
sanctions can also serve the secondary goals of compensation and punish-
ment, but these aims must give way when they conflict with specific
deterrence.
III. THE CURRENT FAILURE OF RULE 11's APPLICATION
A. Failures in Trial Court Application
The question of when conduct is sanctionable is, notably, one area of
Rule 11 jurisprudence that enjoys considerable uniformity.59 Courts have
55. Several court have recognized the Rule's specific deterrence aim. See Brown v. Federation of
State Medical Bds. of the United States, 830 F.2d 1429, 1438 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing specific
and general deterrence goals); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 (9th Cir.) (same), amended, 803
F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (1987); see also Vairo, supra note 11, at 203
("[The rule is designed to achieve a specific deterrent effect.").
56. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL
194-95 (1976). Yet severity of sanction alone is no guide; it may be less important to general deter-
rence than certainty of being detected and sanctioned. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 37, at 25
& n.31; E. PIn-TKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 16-19 (1953). In fact, exceptionally
severe sanctions may be counterproductive, reducing the likelihood of sanctions being imposed. See E.
PuTTKAMMER, supra, at 18.
57. This is where the problem of overdeterrence arises. Aggressive representation of the client's
interests, a premise of the adversary system, can resemble Rule I l's "improper purpose." In addition,
under our system of notice pleading and ample opportunity for discovery, insufficiency of facts in
pleadings is sometimes expected. Perhaps most important, the line between a creative and a frivolous
legal argument can be thin indeed. See sources cited supra note 6. Because Rule 11 operates against
this backdrop, it should be aimed at achieving optimal rather than maximal general deterrence. Cf
Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REv. 777,
801 (1987) (noting possibility of overdeterrence).
58. For a case implementing this approach, see Anschutz Petroleum Mktg. v. E.W. Saybolt &
Co., 112 F.R.D. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). But cf. Parness, More Stringent Sanctions Under Federal
Civil Rule 11: A Reply to Professor Nelken, 75 GEo. L.J. 1937, 1938-39 (1987) (suggesting that
"[p]unishment, compensation, and deterrence may all serve as objectives of rule 11" and recom-
mending that "trial judges should be responsible for expressly articulating ... the purpose(s) of the
sanctions imposed").
59. But see Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 1013 (identifying "the lack of predictability of the stan-
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consistently read an objective standard of sanctionable conduct into the
Rule,"0 and appellate courts frequently have synthesized disparate inter-
pretations within a circuit by reviewing these determinations de novo. 1
Even so, several commentators have proposed frameworks aimed at mak-
ing determinations of when sanctionable conduct occurs more uniform. 2
Since this aspect of Rule 11 has been the focus of most commentary and
proposals for uniformity, this Note will focus on the other two interpretive
questions.
In deciding whom to sanction, courts have rarely discussed their ratio-
nales.6 3 In the absence of guidance, many judges sanction the person
whose signature is on the offending paper-namely, the attorney. Others
decide whom to sanction without explanation." Some judges sanction the
"party," without apportioning the sanction." Occasionally courts have
sanctioned only the client.66 In most Rule 11 cases, judges have sanctioned
either the attorney alone, 7 or both attorney and client.
For Rule 11 to achieve its deterrent aims, the party responsible for the
frivolousness of the pleading must be sanctioned. This will sometimes re-
quire a detailed investigation by the judge, which cannot be avoided if
sanctions are to be properly imposed. However, judges, not wanting to
make a more detailed inquiry into relative fault, often leave apportion-
ment to attorney and client. Joint and several sanctions on attorney and
client provide the clearest example of judicial failure to place sanctions
squarely on the responsible parties based upon relative fault.6 Were Rule
11's primary goal compensation rather than deterrence, this might be
preferable as a matter of policy.69 As it is, joint and several sanctions both
dard of compliance" as one of two major problems with Rule 1i's current operation).
60. See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
61. See sources cited infra note 78.
62. See, e.g., Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499, 536-46 (1986); Note, supra note 6; see also Schwarzer,
supra note 5 (suggesting courts focus on adequacy of inquiry rather than merits of pleading).
63. Nelken, supra note 6, at 1329. A partial exception to this silence is Judge Weinstein's opinion
in Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 569-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), modi-
fied, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
64. See, e.g., Edwards v. Marsh, 644 F. Supp. 1564 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (court splits sanction
evenly between client and attorney without giving reason).
65. These judges may harbor an outmoded agency conception of the attorney-client relationship.
See infra note 90.
66. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1985). Many of the cases
imposing sanctions on nonlawyers involve pro se litigants, particularly in taxpayer suits. E.g., Stites v.
I.R.S., 793 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1986); Auen v. Sweeney, 109 F.R.D. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). According
to Professor Vairo, sanctioning only the client is rare. Vairo, supra note 11, at 227.
67. Courts have specifically sanctioned the offending attorney'sfirm-in one instance even though
it had not been in existence throughout the entire frivolous litigation. See Calloway v. Marvel En-
tertainment Group, 650 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
68. See, e.g., Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Sanctions
imposed jointly and severally on an attorney and her firm, however, might further Rule 1l's deter-
rence goals by encouraging stricter oversight. See Calloway, 650 F. Supp. at 687.
69. See, e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. Muller, 616 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (part of sanction
imposed jointly and severally, reflecting compensation rationale).
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encourage private reallocation or "shifting" of sanctions, which can un-
dercut deterrence, and damage the attorney-client relationship by creating
conflict over how to apportion sanctions unapportioned by the court. 0
As for the determination of what sanction to impose, courts have
reached varying results. Rule 11 explicitly includes monetary sanctions as
an option available to judges,"' and most reported sanctions have been
monetary. Increasingly, however, nonmonetary sanctions are being im-
posed. Certain judges appear to favor monetary over nonmonetary sanc-
tions, and vice versa. Thus, similarly situated violators could receive dif-
ferent types of sanctions depending upon the presiding judge's preferences.
Judicial use of different methods to calculate monetary sanctions is a sec-
ond source of disparity, injecting an element of arbitrariness into Rule 11
cases.72 Frequently, courts have imposed these monetary sanctions sum-
marily, without any indication of how the amount was calculated." Some
judges have imposed monetary sanctions based on "reasonable" attorneys'
fees74 and costs. 5 While some courts proceed to reduce this figure,7 6 not
all consider the same factors in calculating reductions. Finally, numerous
70. For a general discussion of the potential threat to the attorney-client relationship posed by
Rule 11 sanctions, see Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 570 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Note, supra note 31, at
768-70.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
72. See Parness, supra note 21, at 1313 (noting disparities).
73. See, e.g., Woods v. Princeton Packaging, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 215, 218-19 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
The Ninth Circuit overturned a $250,000 lump sum sanction on the grounds that it was not "quanti-
fiable with some precision and properly itemized in terms of the perceived misconduct and the sanc-
tioning authority." In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1184 (9th Cir.), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (1987).
74. For a discussion of fee calculation, see Breger, Compensation Formulas for Court Awarded
Attorney Fees, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 249, 249 (describing "absence of
standards [and] . . . lack of uniformity among trial court fee awards"). Courts have recognized the
need to bridle judicial discretion in other fee-setting contexts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (limiting discretion by setting out twelve factors
judges must consider in calculating "reasonable" attorneys' fees under Title VII). That concepts such
as the lodestar method have been used recently in calculating monetary sanctions under Rule 11
reflects the need for guidance on what sanctions are "appropriate." See Eastway, 637 F. Supp. at
571-72.
75. The term "costs" is statutorily defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982). "Costs" refers to miscella-
neous filing, duplication and witness costs incident to litigation, and are usually small compared to
attorneys' fees.
A few courts have added to statutory costs and reasonable attorneys' fees the cost to taxpayers of the
court's time spent on the frivolous filing, thus turning Rule 11 into a means of compensating the
judicial system. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 559
(N.D. Cal. 1987) ($15,000 to be paid into court for "unnecessary consumption of the court's time and
resources"). The cost of the court's time is usually calculated at $600 per hour-a figure drawn from
a recent law review article that calculated the average cost of an hour of a federal court's time. See
Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 219, 227 (1985). But see
Edwards v. Marsh, 644 F. Supp. 1564, 1573 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (calculating court's time at $20 per
hour). One commentator has advocated the use of Rule 11 to compensate courts for their wasted
resources. Parness, supra note 14, at 352-62.
76. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 572-75 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (specifying six mitigating factors), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
269 (1987).
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judges have imposed "fines" under Rule 11-monetary sanctions unre-
lated to expense incurred and reflecting a punitive rationale."
B. Failures in Appellate Synthesis
Appellate courts have applied different standards of review to the three
interpretive issues raised by Rule 11. Because Rule 11 requires judges to
sanction specified types of proscribed conduct, the "when" question has
been considered by most appeals courts to be a question of law and re-
viewed on a de novo basis.78 By contrast, all appeals courts have consid-
ered the "who" and "what" questions to be matters within the discretion
of the trial judge, and therefore reviewable only on an "abuse of discre-
tion" standard. Thus, while divergent answers to the first question have
enjoyed a measure of appellate synthesis,79 courts of appeals have less fre-
quently reviewed answers to the second and third queries, and then only
to define the outer parameters of discretion. District courts lack appellate
guidance to fill the vacuum left by the Advisory Committee Notes and the
language of the Rule itself.8"
IV. THE BENEFITS OF A UNIFORM CONCEPTION OF RULE 11
Judicial acceptance of this Note's overall conception of Rule 11-in-
cluding the Rule's primary deterrence purpose and its three, interrelated
components-would promote uniformity in Rule 11 sanctions. In addi-
tion, the guidelines and factors described in Section V could provide
needed direction to trial judges deciding whom to sanction and what sanc-
tion is appropriate. Guidelines have been used in other contexts to chan-
nel the exercise of a trial judge's discretion." While restrictive of judicial
77. See, e.g., Robinson v. Moses, 644 F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ($3600 fine in
addition to costs and attorneys' fees); Blocker v. Oil & Marine Corp., 113 F.R.D. 55, 59-60 (E.D.
La. 1986) ($7500 fine). For a discussion of the problematic nature of such fines, see supra note 52
and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Zaldivar v.
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). Some circuits, including the Fourth and
Tenth, review the question of when conduct is sanctionable on an abuse of discretion standard. See
generally Vairo, supra note 11, at 225-27; Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Contrasting Applications in the
Second and Fourth Circuits, 46 MD. L. REV. 470 (1987). The Fifth Circuit recently abandoned de
novo review in favor of the abuse of discretion standard. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866
(5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
79. See cases cited supra note 78.
80. The structure of Rule 11-mandating the imposition of sanctions when violations occur, but
leaving wide discretion to set the kind and amount of sanction-presents heightened opportunities for
strategic and interactive decisionmaking on the part of judges in this controversial area of law. See,
e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing Chief
Judge Weinstein's determination that Rule 11 had not been violated), on remand, 637 F. Supp. 558,
576-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (imposing minimal sanction of $1,000), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.)
(raising amount of sanction to $10,000 and summarily imposing it rather than remanding for adjust-
ment), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
81. In the federal sentencing area, a commission created pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 991, 98 Stat. 1837, 2017 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991
(Supp. III 1985)), has promulgated sentencing guidelines aimed at increasing the uniformity of crimi-
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flexibility, guidelines offer numerous benefits,82 including better notice,
increased fairness and efficiency, and most importantly, optimal
deterrence.
Fairness requires the legal system to apply uniform standards to those
who are similarly situated. Guidelines that address whom to sanction and
factors to be weighed in determining appropriate sanctions are especially
needed to ensure equal treatment under Rule 11, since a major argument
undercutting the Rule's legitimacy has been that disagreement among
judges has produced widely disparate results.8 Moreover, such guidelines
would provide better notice to lawyers and clients about their respective
areas of responsibility for frivolous submissions, 4 and increase judicial ef-
ficiency in administering Rule 11 cases.85
Nonuniformity in the method of calculating Rule 11 sanctions can seri-
ously undermine the Rule's primary purpose of deterrence. As those stud-
ying the problem of indeterminacy in the area of sentencing reform have
recognized, treating similarly situated defendants differently may create
unfair results or undercut the deterrent effect of criminalizing conduct.86
In criminal sentencing, uniform treatment of similarly situated offenders
has come to be seen as fairer, more effective, and more efficient than indi-
vidualized judgments about individual offenders.87
As applied today, Rule 11 probably both underdeters and overdeters.
For example, it may overdeter plaintiffs' lawyers who often work on a
contingency fee basis and who may be unwilling to pursue an innovative
legal claim for fear of incurring a massive sanction. 88 On the other hand,
nal sentences. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL 2 (West
1987); Robinson, supra note 35.
82. See generally Friendly, supra note 30, at 768.
83. See, e.g., S. KASSIN, supra note 4, at 45 (criticizing inconsistent standards in application).
84. To facilitate giving notice to clients (who are not required under Rule 11 to sign and certify
submissions), lawyers could be obligated to inform their clients of the areas of client liability for Rule
11 sanctions. The Eleventh Circuit has recently noted that while the mere existence of Rule 11 usu-
ally will provide attorneys with adequate notice, when client sanctions are contemplated, "due process
will demand more specific notice." Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
banc).
85. By providing greater certainty and predictability to litigants, guidelines would probably re-
duce the total amount of Rule 11 litigation. See Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds. of the
United States, 830 F.2d 1429, 1440 (7th Cir. 1987).
86. Robinson, supra note 35, at 8.
87. For the argument that certainty produces greater deterrence, see Nagel, Discretion in the
Criminal Justice System: Analyzing, Channeling, Reducing, and Controlling It, 31 EMORY L.J.
603, 603-04 (1982); Robinson, supra note 35, at 8.
The major arguments leveled against sentencing reform claims to greater deterrence-that low
probabilities of apprehension and conviction, and the possibility of parole, undermine the deterrent
value of uniform sentences-do not apply in the Rule 11 context. Undetected Rule 11 abuses are far
less likely than undetected crimes because opposing lawyers have a built-in incentive to move for
sanctions, and judges are explicitly empowered to raise the issue sua sponte. See generally J.
ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 34-65 (1974) (discussing factors influencing general
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 56, at 92-209 (same).
88. Rule 11 provides that monetary sanctions, if imposed, may be based on "the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing .... ." FED. R. CIV. P. 11. This formula increases
the likelihood that plaintiffs' lawyers will suffer high monetary sanctions, particularly since many
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the Rule probably underdeters defense counsel in large firms representing
wealthy individuals or corporations. These lawyers and their clients might
agree to risk Rule 11 sanctions, for example, in order to delay a judgment,
particularly if there is a chance that only a minimal sanction will be im-
posed. Moreover, defense counsel in large firms often can surreptitiously
shift sanctions onto clients, particularly onto longstanding ones.89 In both
of these contexts, a more uniform method of calculating and imposing
sanctions, which takes account of the differential need to deter and is but-
tressed by safeguards against shifting, would optimize deterrence.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE NEGLECTED COMPONENTS
A. Whom to Sanction?
Case law indicates that the decision of whom to sanction under Rule 11
often depends upon which type of sanctionable conduct has occurred.
While judges have not expressly analyzed the question of whom to sanc-
tion in these terms, the case law does suggest that different criteria are
determinative for each type of violation. The following guidelines have an
empirical as well as a normative component: They incorporate as well as
extend the case law.
1. Submissions Not Warranted by Existing Law
Usually the attorney should bear sole responsibility for submitting a
pleading or motion not warranted by law in violation of Rule 11.90 Nor-
mally a client will not be in a position to judge the validity of, 1 or to urge
her lawyer to make, unwarranted legal claims. 2 Since legally frivolous
violations comprise a large percentage of Rule 11 cases, handling them
Rule 11 sanctions are imposed for complaints. Complaints may provoke time-consuming dismissal or
summary judgment motions as well as costly discovery proceedings. On the other hand, defense attor-
neys are most often sanctioned for motions.
89. For a discussion of the problem of sanction shifting, see infra Section V-B-2.
90. See, e.g., Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988) (nonlaw-
yer clients should not be expected to understand law); Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp.
189, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Occasionally courts have imposed sanctions for legally frivolous submis-
sions on both attorney and client. See, e.g., Shaps v. D.F.D.S. A/F Copenhagen, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(Callaghan) 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). This approach reflects either a compensation rationale or a tradi-
tional agency conception of the attorney-client relationship. The agency theory justifies holding the
principal at least partly liable for the agent's acts and omissions. See R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C.
MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
70-73 (Federal Judicial Center 1981).
91. See Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 17, at 331 n.228 (sanctionable conduct more
often attorney's than client's).
92. A few courts have considered the client's legal sophistication a reason for holding him at least
partially liable for sanctions. See, e.g., Thrush v. Morrison, 665 F. Supp. 372, 376 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
($6,000 sanction imposed jointly and severally on attorney and on client who was "no stranger to the
law"). But even if a legally sophisticated client knowingly urges her lawyer to advocate legally frivo-
lous positions, the lawyer should bear the sanctions because he can more easily avoid the cost that an
unwarranted legal submission imposes on the legal system and the opposing party.
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summarily by applying a rule of attorney liability will contribute to a
more efficient overall application of the Rule.
Courts are just beginning to address the difficult question of how to
allocate sanctions among multiple attorneys who participate in preparing
the legally frivolous submission.93 These cases are rapidly changing the
duties of cooperating lawyers under Rule 11.9' In general, judges should
sanction only the attorney who has prepared the legally frivolous
submission.95
2. Submissions Not Well Grounded in Fact
Under this prong of Rule 11, courts are defining, in piecemeal fashion,
the division of responsibilities between attorney and client. At risk of
drawing sanctions are submissions that either contain untrue facts, or omit
facts that are or should be within the knowledge of the filing party.96
Because the Rule explicitly imposes a duty upon the certifying attorney to
make a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the factual basis and to certify
that a submission is "well grounded" in fact, courts often have held the
lawyer liable for factually frivolous submissions. On the other hand, many
of these cases involve clients who provide their attorneys with false facts
that form the basis of the attorney's submissions.
Courts generally will have to make a more detailed inquiry into respon-
sibility for factually frivolous pleadings than for other types of violations.
If a client knowingly provides false facts,97 or provides facts that the client
should have known were false, then the client should be sanctioned.98 Cli-
ents should not be sanctioned, however, when the attorney fails to ask the
93. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt., 108 F.R.D. 96, 102-05
(D.N.J. 1985); Navarro v. Cohan, 109 F.R.D. 86 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (partner sanctioned for associate's
frivolous pleading).
94. Compare Coburn Optical Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 660 n.7 (M.D.N.C. 1985)
(local counsel may sometimes rely on "representations of reputable out of state attorneys") with Pravic
v. U.S. Industries-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (cautioning that "an attorney
may not rely on a legal memorandum prepared by a second lawyer without independently verifying
the reasoning [or] 'Shepardizing' the cases cited") and Long v. Quantex Resources, Inc., 108 F.R.D.
416 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (local counsel sanctioned for filing facially frivolous papers prepared by foreign
counsel).
95. Usually local counsel alone should be sanctioned for procedural errors because of local coun-
sel's obvious expertise in this area. In addition, judges should read the signature by local counsel as
binding on lead counsel, see, e.g., AM Int'l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 80 C 4016 (N.D. Ill.
June 27, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), and hold the latter responsible for all substantive
legal frivolousness. Cf Monument Builders v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 647 F. Supp. 972 (D. Kan.
1986) (sanctions against local counsel shifted to primary counsel where local counsel came in after
filing and did not prepare papers).
96. In keeping with our system of notice pleading, courts have been careful not to sanction for
complaints that omit facts in the adversary's control. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987). For the argument that Rule 11 may have altered
the factual pleading requirements under FED. R. Civ. P. 8, see Vairo, supra note 11, at 220.
97. See, e.g., Kappenberger v. Oates, 663 F. Supp. 991, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
98. Holding the attorney liable in such a case would fail to deter the dishonest client and would
encourage excessive investigation of the client's story. This could erode the attorney-client relationship.
The Yale Law Journal
right questions to elicit legally relevant facts.99 In addition, the attorney
should be sanctioned for failure to take minimal steps to confirm the cli-
ent's facts, when these facts could be verified easily by reference to the
public record or to accessible documents.'00
3. Submissions Interposed for an Improper Purpose
Lawyers frequently have been sanctioned for improper purpose viola-
tions. 10 Often, however, courts have without explanation simply sanc-
tioned both attorney and client for these kinds of violations, apparently on
the belief that somehow attorney and client shared the improper purpose.
Courts should generally place responsibility for improper purpose viola-
tions on the lawyer since she exercises primary control over the litigation.
Sanctioning the attorney will create an incentive for the attorney to sec-
ond-guess the client in matters of legal strategy-the result that should be
fostered. 0 2 Ultimately, it is the attorney who, as an officer of the court,
must ensure that the court's processes are not abused.
Courts should scrutinize two types of filings, however, as potentially
warranting client sanctions under the improper purpose prong of Rule 11:
re-filed complaints and post-judgment motions filed by clients who have
retained new lawyers. Courts could handle such re-filed complaints in
several ways °.1 3 They could require attorneys to investigate the past litiga-
tion record of new clients and sanction attorneys who could have discov-
ered that a client's prior identical complaint had been dismissed. Alterna-
99. See, e.g., Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 85 (1987). The Rule states that an attorney has a duty to make a "reasonable inquiry" into the
factual basis for a submission. An ABA study of Rule 11 and other sanctions in federal courts advises
attorneys to "[cjonduct a thorough personal interview with [their] client and key witnesses about the
pleading," as well as to "[rieview pertinent documents that may support the pleading." ABA REPORT,
supra note 7, at 25.
100. For example, in Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn.
1984), the attorney was sanctioned for not checking relevant medical records which would have re-
vealed that the statute of limitations had run. But see Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel., 791 F.2d
1006, 1012 (2d Cir. 1986) (attorney reasonably relied on client's statements that client's employer
received federal military grants).
Like the duty to make a "reasonable inquiry" into the facts, the attorney's duty to check public
records would not impinge on the attorney-client relationship. See also Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1265,
1277-78 (attorney must take reasonable steps to verify client's information but need not pass judg-
ment on client's credibility); Advisory Notes, supra note 6, at 199.
101. The court in In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985), affirmed the imposition of
sanctions on a bankruptcy lawyer for filing frivolous claims aimed at delaying the implementation of
an agreed-upon bankruptcy settlement. Judge Easterbrook rejected the lawyer's defense that he had
filed the submissions at the insistence of his client. Id. at 446. Similarly, the court in Mohammed v.
Union Carbide Corp. observed, "[ain attorney is obligated to dissuade his client from pursuing spe-
cious claims." 606 F. Supp. 252, 261 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
102. The danger to attorney-client relations under this branch of Rule 11 is not nearly as great as
under the factual branch. See supra note 98.
103. McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1986), illustrates the repeat litigant sce-
nario. In McLaughlin, the plaintiff brought four successive, roughly identical suits over a seven-year
period. After losing in one court, the plaintiff simply refiled in another. See also Becker v. Dunkin'




tively, courts could analyze these cases under the insufficient-as-of-law
element and sanction the attorney because the complaint was barred by
res judicata. These approaches are problematic because in most of these
cases the client, and not the attorney, is the moving force. To impose sanc-
tions on attorneys would not deter the client. On the other hand, when the
same attorney remains with the repeat litigant throughout an entire cam-
paign of harassment,10 4 or a new attorney is put on notice of the history of
frivolous litigation,'0 5 the court should allocate sanctions evenly between
attorney and client, based on a presumption of equal fault.
Post-judgment motions interposed for an improper purpose"0 8 also call
for client sanctions, at least where the client changes attorneys after a
settlement is reached or the case concluded. Only by placing the sanction
on the client will courts deter this type of abuse. Frivolous post-judgment
motions by the same attorney who tried the case should fall on the attor-
ney, however.
B. What Sanction is "Appropriate"?
Because Rule 11 leaves the choice of sanction entirely to the trial
judge's discretion, judges have employed widely divergent approaches un-
related to the need to deter the offending party. To increase uniformity,
trial judges should consider various factors in setting monetary sanctions
and ensure that monetary sanctions are not passed on to innocent parties.
Appellate courts should review decisions about what sanction is appropri-
ate under a heightened abuse of discretion standard.
1. Factors To Be Used by Judges in Determining Monetary Sanctions
In calculating monetary sanctions, courts have considered different fac-
tors, including the sanctioned person's limited resources, 0 7 the nature of
the plaintiff's claims, 0 " and the need to compensate a party for expenses.
104. E.g., Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Ga. 1987) (plaintiff's attorney sanc-
tioned when continued second suit after initial suit was lost).
105. See, e.g., Charlton v. Estate of Charlton, 2 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 596 (D. Ariz.
1985).
106. For example, in Chevron v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985), the defendant filed a
Rule 60(b) motion attempting to set aside a judgment after her original attorney had entered into a
stipulation to which she had agreed. The court directly sanctioned defendant for a frivolous Rule
60(b) motion aimed solely at delaying the judgment.
107. E.g., Dunkin' Donuts, 665 F. Supp. at 218. Courts have also considered the sanctioned
person's net worth a reason for not reducing a sanctions award. E.g., Eppes v. Snowden, 656 F.Supp.
1267 (E.D. Ky. 1986) ($194,000 sanction).
108. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (civil rights plaintiff claiming violation of due
process should be accorded greater leeway in making arguments), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101
(1988); O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 640 F. Supp. 1451 (W.D. Okla. 1986). But see Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument that "special treatment of sanc-
tions should be given to attorneys who handle unpopular civil rights claims, particularly those repre-
senting indigents and minority clients"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987).
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Other courts have deemed the requested fees inflated,0 9 or invoked a
"duty to mitigate"' " to reduce the cost of legal fees incurred by the oppo-
site side, implying that opposing counsel spent too much time opposing a
frivolous paper.11' Occasionally courts have increased the amount of a
monetary sanction where the offending attorney or her firm is expert in a
particular area.
There is already a trend towards requiring district judges to specify the
grounds for deciding which sanction to impose,12 and appellate courts
have sometimes reversed monetary sanctions for lack of specification."' In
keeping with this trend, judges should consider specific factors in setting
monetary Rule 11 sanctions.11 The base figure should be calculated ac-
cording to a uniform method," 5 based on cost incurred by the opposing
side but not on court costs.11 This method of initial calculation acknowl-
edges that Rule 11, though aimed primarily at deterrence, also includes a
compensatory purpose. Judges should then reduce this figure to achieve
the Rule's primary purpose of deterrence. 17 In reducing monetary sanc-
tions, judges should consider six factors:"'
109. See, e.g., McIntyre's Mini Computer Sales Group v. Creative Synergy Corp., 644 F. Supp.
589, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (calling amount of requested fees "astounding").
110. See, e.g., In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1185 (9th Cir.), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (1987).
111. See, e.g., Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir. 1987)
(upholding district court's reduction of attorneys' fees by 10% due to overlawyering); Wolst v. Ameri-
can Airlines, 668 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (criticizing attorney requesting fees for
including time for self-education).
112. See, e.g., Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds. of the United States, 830 F.2d 1429,
1438 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[I]n cases involving substantial awards a district judge [must] state with some
specificity the reasons for the imposition of a sanction, and the manner in which the sanction was
computed.") (emphasis added). But see Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 882-83 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (requiring specific findings of district court only when sanctions imposed are substan-
tial in type, amount, or effect).
113. See, e.g., Cauley v. Wilson, 754 F.2d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 1985). But see Ordower v. Feldman,
826 F.2d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Brown, 830 F.2d at 1440 (requiring specification of
basis for finding Rule violated). Requiring such specification will probably not consume more judicial
resources of trial courts, since fewer remands will occur. Id. at 1438.
114. These factors might also be useful in choosing between monetary and nonmonetary sanc-
tions, or among various nonmonetary sanctions. Since most sanctions under Rule 11 are monetary, the
enumerated factors will be aimed at the determination of monetary awards.
115. In Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 124-26 (2d Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987), Judge Pratt, in dissent, recognized the need for a
uniform method of calculating Rule 11 sanctions that were purportedly based on attorneys' fees. He
argued that the lodestar figure should be the starting point, and that judges should consider only the
financial resources of the sanctioned person in deciding whether to reduce the award.
116. Professor Nelken has proposed limiting monetary sanctions to the costs and fees incurred by
opposing parties. Nelken, supra note 6, at 1353. Contra Parness, supra note 58, at 1941-42 (arguing
that Nelken's suggestion may render monetary sanctions ineffective where sanctioned party's conduct
is especially egregious, cost incurred is small, or both parties have violated Rule). Nelken's proposal
makes sense given the danger of overdeterrence. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Parness
overlooks the possibility of adding nonmonetary sanctions to monetary awards in these circumstances.
117. Occasionally deterrence will require adding nonmonetary sanctions onto this base monetary
amount.
118. This list builds on Chief Judge Weinstein's analysis in Eastway, 637 F. Supp. at 572-75. In
modifying, the Second Circuit specifically declined to rule on the appropriateness of Weinstein's fac-
tors. Eastway, 821 F.2d at 123.
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(1) The violator's general bad faith or vindictive desire to punish the
opponent.
(2) The degree of frivolousness.
These first two factors address the degree to which the violator has
abused the court's processes and thus may be directly relevant to the
amount and kind of sanction necessary to achieve specific deterrence." 9
(3) The violator's ability to pay.
Obviously, the sanctioned person's ability to pay will have an effect on
the deterrent value of any given sanction: the poorer the target, the greater
the deterrence achieved. 2
(4) The violator's level of experience and general reputation.
If the violator is inexperienced, a smaller sanction may suffice to
achieve deterrence.12
(5) The importance of not discouraging particular types of litigation.
Deterrence can only be achieved meaningfully against the backdrop of
congressionally created disincentives and incentives for litigants. If Con-
gress has expressed a clear preference for encouraging particular types of
litigants by enacting a fee-shifting statute, then courts should reduce the
monetary sanction. Thus, civil rights plaintiffs or others suing under stat-
utes that provide for fee-shifting should have this mitigating factor
considered. 122
(6) The fee basis of representation.
In deciding how much deterrence a particular monetary sanction will
produce, courts should consider the fee basis underlying the representa-
tion. Defense attorneys, who work on an hourly fee basis, will generally
be able to pay monetary sanctions out of their billings, subject to market
constraints on their fee rates. On the other hand, plaintiffs' attorneys who
operate on a contingent fee basis may not have such billings to use to pay
monetary sanctions. Thus, all else being equal, the same monetary sanc-
tion imposed on a plaintiff's attorney working on a contingent fee basis
will have more of a deterrent effect. This consideration is related to the
ability to pay factor. After considering all of the foregoing factors, judges
should set the monetary sanction so that the violator is neither over- nor
underdeterred.
This Note's list of six factors includes five of Chief Judge Weinstein's. It omits the need to compen-
sate as a separate factor because compensatory goals are already reflected in the calculation of the
sanction's base. The Note's sixth factor, which concerns the fee basis of representation, will be rele-
vant to deterrence in cases where attorneys are sanctioned.
119. See Advisory Notes, supra note 6, at 200 (judge should consider violator's state of mind in
setting type and amount of sanction).
120. See, e.g., Kappenberger v. Oates, 663 F. Supp. 991, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
121. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 201.
122. See cases cited supra note 108.
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2. Avoiding the Shifting Problem
If lawyers or clients are able to shift sanctions onto innocent parties,
Rule 11's specific deterrent effect will largely be lost.123 To the extent that
sanctions harm a lawyer's reputation, of course, they cannot be shifted
onto clients. The vast majority of Rule 11 sanctions, however, contain
some shiftable element. 12 4
Joint and several sanctions pose special problems, because they actually
encourage private shifting of sanctions. Even when courts impose sanc-
tions on both attorney and client (but not jointly and severally), informal
shifting may occur unless the court explicitly bars it. Shifting in any form
enables attorneys and clients to undo the court's assignment of relative
fault.
Courts are only beginning to tailor monetary sanctions so that they can-
not be shifted. A small but growing number of Rule 11 cases have con-
tained outright directives against shifting.1"5 Courts could easily incorpo-
rate such anti-shifting directives in their opinions. A more effective way to
prevent shifting would be to amend the Rule to incorporate an explicit
ban on shifting. 6 In addition, courts could require attorneys to give their
clients a copy of the sanction order.1 2
C. Review Under a "Heightened" Abuse of Discretion Standard
The abuse of discretion standard is subject to wide interpretation.1 28
This disparity is not necessarily a bad thing; indeed, according to Judge
123. The problem of shifting Rule 11 sanctions has received only passing mention in the litera-
ture. See, e.g., Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case
from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 802 (1981); Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11,
supra note 17, at 331 n.228; Note, Intended Application, supra note 17, at 353-54.
124. Perhaps the only exceptions are oral or written reprimands and disciplinary proceedings. An
attorney's costs in defending herself in disciplinary proceedings could, at least conceivably, be shifted
onto a longstanding client.
Most Rule 11 sanctions have been monetary, a kind of sanction particulary susceptible to shifting.
For a discussion of whether Rule 11 sanctions might be covered by legal malpractice policies, see
Hamilton, McKee & Levitt, Insurability of Monetary Sanctions Under Attorney Errors and Omis-
sions Policies, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 520 (1987).
125. See, e.g., Motown Prods. v. Cacomm, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Wold v.
Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1983), the court ordered defendant's attorneys to
pay sanctions to plaintiff with the stipulation that "payment of these expenses shall not be reimbursed
directly or indirectly from the funds, assets or resources of [defendant] itself." Id. at 168; see also
Hatteras of Lauderdale, Inc. v. Gemini Lady, 662 F. Supp. 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
126. A provision could be enacted much like the unadopted amendment to Rule 37, governing
discovery sanctions, recommended in 1980 by an ABA Special Committee:
(g). Sanctions Against An Attorney. Whenever the court imposes a monetary sanction upon
an attorney in accordance with these rules, the attorney or his firm shall satisfy such sanction
and shall not, directly or indirectly, charge any portion of such sanction to his client or
receive or accept any portion of such sanction from his client.
Section of Litigation, ABA, Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse,
92 F.R.D. 137, 147-48 (1980) (italics in original).
127. See Peckham, supra note 123, at 802. This would allow clients to guard against shifting and
would thus enhance the deterrent effect of the sanction.
128. See Friendly, supra note 30, at 762-64, 783-84; Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial
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Friendly, it may be "not only defensible but essential."1"' The reasons for
using a strict as opposed to a loose abuse of discretion standard will vary
according to the nature of the decision. 30 More circuits should apply the
most stringent "abuse of discretion" standard, thereby vigilantly monitor-
ing district court exercise of discretion under Rule 11.131 This is begin-
ning to happen in a few courts.1"2
VI. CONCLUSION
Because amended Rule 11 gives the trial judge almost total discretion to
determine whom to sanction and what sanction is "appropriate," sanctions
under the Rule have varied widely. Certain judges have become known as
frequent sanctioners, while others have only rarely imposed sanctions.
Some have viewed sanctions primarily as a means of compensating liti-
gants for costs incurred in defending against frivolous motions; others have
employed the Rule more sparingly and primarily to punish. This Note
has proposed a conceptual framework for viewing Rule 11, including a
focus on deterrence and suggested guidelines and factors to trim the dis-
cretion of trial judges. The application of this framework will increase the
uniformity of Rule 11 sanctions and optimize deterrence of frivolous liti-
gation in the federal courts.
Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 650-53 (1971). For example, trial judges are
given almost unreviewable discretion to decide whether to grant a request to require the jury to render
a special verdict under Rule 49(a), but their discretion to deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a) is
more circumscribed. See Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the
Trial and Appellate Levels, 64 N.C.L. REV. 993, 1039 (1986).
129. Friendly, supra note 30, at 764.
130. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1981) (while need for first-hand
observation of litigants or newness and variability of circumstances may initially require deference to
trial judge's decision, once factors important to making discretionary decision "emerge from the mon-
tage of fact patterns," as in attorneys' fee area generally, then less deference should be accorded).
131. But see Levin & Sobel, supra note 7, at 600 (arguing that appellate courts have exercised
their reviewing power in balanced fashion and that to give less respect to district court discretion could
produce "intolerably burdensome proliferation of satellite litigation").
132. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395, 397 (7th Cir.) (finding $10,500 sanction on pro
se litigant abuse of discretion "particularly without a sufficient statement of reasons" and reducing
sanction to $5,000), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 349 (1987).
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